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Easton Business Opportunities, Inc. v. Town Executive Suites - E. Marketplace, LLC 
126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 13 (May 6, 2010)1
 
 
CONTRACT LAW- REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE AGREEMENTS 
 
Summary 
 A multi-faceted appeal involving interpretion of a real estate brokerage agreement that 
included an “extender” clause.   
Disposition/Outcome 
 The Court concluded first, that a real estate commission is assignable where the change 
does not materially alter the contract.Second, the Court concluded that  an implied duty of notice 
does not exist unless the plain language of a contract requires it.  Finally, the Court reversed and 
remanded to the district court for further findings. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 Town Executive Suites- Eastern Marketplace, LLC (“TES”), as seller, and Century 21 
Advantage Gold and Michael Brelsford, as broker (collectively, “Century 21”) entered into a 
brokerage agreement by which Century 21 had the “exclusive and irrevocable” right to sell TES’ 
office suite business from May 19, 2003 to November 18, 2003.  If the business sold during this 
period, TES would owe Century 21 a 10 percent commission regardless of who originated the 
sale.  Additionally, the agreement contained an “extender” clause by which TES would owe 
Century 21 a 10 percent commission if within 180 days of the final termination the business was 
sold to anyone to whom Century 21 had shown the property to prior to the final termination.2
 In January 2004, TES sold its business to Chip Lightman after the exclusive listing had 
expired, but still within the 180-day extender-clause period.  TES did not check with Century 21 
to see if Lightman was someone to whom Century 21 had shown the property to, thus triggering 
a commission under the extender clause.  Assuming the sale would be commission-free, TES 
sold its business to Lightman for a lower price. 
 
 The district court found the following facts to be undisputed:  (1) Century 21 showed the 
TES business to Lightman during the exclusive listing period; and (2) TES sold its business to 
Lightman during the extender-clause period. Still, the district court found for TES because TES 
“did not knowingly breach” the agreement since it did not know at the time of sale, that Century 
21 had shown the business to Lightman.  
 Keith Easton was the agent at Century 21 who handled the TES listing.  In December 
2003, after the listing expired but during the extender-clause period, Easton left Century 21 to 
open Easton Business Opportunities, Inc. Easton purchased his listings and expirations from 
Century 21 when he left. Although no formal written agreement was produced, in a May 2006 
affidavit, Brelsford confirmed that Easton had purchased said rights in December 2003.  
Subsequently, Easton learned of the TES-Lightman sale and demanded his commission due from 
TES.  TES refused.  By then, TES had allegedly transferred most of its assets, including the 
office suite sale proceeds to its principal, Michael A. Vespi, or its affiliate, Town Consulting 
LLC. 
                                                          
1 By Kimberly Duque. 
2 The extender clause contained an exception that did not apply in this case. 
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 Appellants Keith Easton and Easton Business Opportunities, Inc. (collectively, Easton) 
sued for the commission - naming respondents TES, Vespi, and Town Consulting (collectively, 
TES) as defendants on breach of contract, alter ego, unjust enrichment, and fraudulent 
conveyance claims.  The district court entered judgment against Easton on all claims and 
awarded respondents attorney fees and costs.  Easton appealed. 
 
Discussion 
 
Assignability 
 The Court held that, based on clear principles of contract law, contractual rights are 
assignable unless the assignment materially changes the terms of the contract or the contract 
expressly precludes assignment.3  The Court determined that Century 21’s assignment of 
commission rights to Easton did not materially alter the agreements as to TES.  When the 
assignment occurred, all of the broker’s obligations had been fulfilled.  The only obligation 
remaining was that of TES’ potential obligation to pay the broker a commission.  Since “a 
change in the person to whom the payment is to be made is not ordinarily material,”4 the 
assignment in this case was not material.  The Court further concluded that the agreement did not 
contain a valid anti-assignment clause.  Although the agreement included a no-oral-modification 
clause, it did not work to exclude assignments because an assignment does not modify the terms 
of the contract5
 The district court alternatively held that even if the assignment was permitted, it could 
not prevail because it did not occur until May 2006, when Brelsford’s affidavit was filed.  
Because the Thelin rule prohibits post-suit assignments from relating back to the date the 
complaint was filed, the district court dismissed the assignment pursuant toNRCP 17(a).
.  Lastly, the Court held that failure to give the obligor notice of the assignment 
does not invalidate an otherwise valid assignment. 
6  The 
Court rejected this conclusion on two grounds.  First, the 1971 amendments to the real party in 
interest provisions in NRCP 17(a) supersede Thelin.7  Under the current rule, the assignee is the 
real party in interest even when the claim is not assigned until after the action has been 
instituted.8
 Second, the district court’s finding that the assignment did not occur until May 2006 
incorrectly presupposed that a valid assignment requires a signed writing or notice to the obligor.  
Generally, “there are no prescribed formalities that must be observed to make an effective 
assignment.”
  Since the affidavit confirmed that Easton had the sole right to sue for the 
commission and it evidenced Century 21’s assignment of rights, TES was protected from 
inconsistent claims or judgments and NRCP 17(a) was satisfied. 
9
                                                          
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317(2)(a)-(c) (1981). 
  Instead, the assignor must manifest a present intention to transfer a contractual 
4 Id. § 317 cmt. d. 
5 Citibank, N.A. v. Tele/Resources, Inc., 724 F.2d 266, 269 (2d Cir. 1983). 
6 See Thelin v. Intermountain Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc., 80 Nev. 285, 290-91, 392 P.2d 626, 628 (1964). 
7 Significantly, Nev. R. Civ. Pro. 17(a) was modeled after Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 17(a) which makes clear that the 
“function of the [real party in interest] rule in its negative aspect is to protect the defendant against a subsequent 
action by the party actually entitled to recover ” - not to constrain the parties in a “straight jacket of technical rules 
of pleading and procedure”. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 17(a) advisory committee’s note (1966); 6A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT 
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §1545, at 351 n. 11. (2d ed. 1990).  
8 WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 1545, at 350-51. 
9 9 JOHN E. MURRAY, JR., CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §47.7 at 147 (rev. ed. 2007). 
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right to the assignee.10
 
  Here, this intent manifested on December 8, 2003, when Century 21 
accepted payment for Easton in exchange for certain listings and expiration rights.  Because the 
agreement was silent on assignment, the assignment was effective on December 8, 2003, not 
May 2006.  
Implied Duty to Notify 
 The Court reversed the district court’s finding that the agreement imposed a duty on the 
broker to provide TES with a list of potential buyers that would trigger commission liability 
under the extender clause.  The agreement did not condition the seller’s liability for the 
commission on the seller being notified of potential buyers who carried commission risk or 
knowingly selling out from under the broker.  Therefore, a commission was owed under the 
agreement as written.  The Court refused to follow the minority view which imposes an implied 
duty to notify the seller of commission-risk buyers, concluding that the better-reasoned view is 
the majority one: absent contract provision or statutory requirement, an agreement will be 
enforced as written.   
 Furthermore, the Court refused to construe the contract against its drafters, appellants, 
because TES failed to identify any textual ambiguity in the agreement.  The court reasoned that 
simply because the commission could have been avoided or passed on to the buyer if the seller 
had checked with the broker did not introduce an ambiguity into the agreement.  A court has the 
obligation to enforce an unambiguous agreement as written, absent conflict with statute, offense 
to public policy, ambiguity, fraud, unconscionability, or other recognized bases for avoidance.  
  
 
Fraudulent Conveyance 
 The Court determined that the fraudulent conveyance claim did not concern TES’ sale of 
its business to Lightman but TES’ transfer of the proceeds of that sale and other assets to its 
affiliates.  Since the district court did not make the findings required to adjudicate the fraudulent 
conveyance claim under Herup v. First Boston Financial11 and Sportsco Enterprises v. Morris,12
  
 
the Court reversed and remanded this issue for further proceedings.  
Conclusion 
The Court held that the brokerage commission was validly assigned without notice for 
two reasons.  First, it did not materially modify the agreement and second, the agreement did not 
expressly disallow assignment.   
Next, the Court emphasized the established rule that a court cannot reallocate the 
responsibility of risk laid out in an agreement without adequate legal or contractual basis. 
Because the real estate commission did not include a duty of notice, the Court refused to 
recognize an obligation to provide notice.  Finally, because the district court did not make the 
proper findings required to adjudicate the fraudulent conveyance claim, the Court reversed and 
remanded this issue. 
 
 
 
                                                          
10  Stuhmer, Inc. v. Centaur Sculpture Galleries, Ltd., 110 Nev. 270, 275, 871 P.2d 327, 331 (1994).  
11 123 Nev. 228, 162 P.3d 870 (2007). 
12 112 Nev. 625, 917 P.2d 934 (1996). 
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OPINION 
  
By the Court, PICKERING, J.: 
            This dispute involves a commission claimed under an exclusive right-to-sell brokerage 
agreement for the sale of a business.  After a bench trial, the district court ruled in favor of the 
seller and against the broker’s assignee.  It found the assignment ineffective and the commission 
unrecoverable, based on the broker’s breach of an implied duty to have given the seller a list of 
the people to whom the broker had shown the business, to whom the seller could not sell during 
the extension period without incurring liability for a commission.  The agreement, as written, 
supports the opposite result and should have been upheld.  Upholding the commission claim 
makes it necessary to reach the assignee’s fraudulent conveyance claims, as to which unresolved 
issues of fact remain.  Accordingly, we reverse and remand. 
I. 
            The brokerage agreement was between Town Executive Suites–Eastern Marketplace, 
LLC (TES), as seller, and Century 21-Advantage Gold and Michael Brelsford, as broker 
(collectively, Century 21).  The agreement gave Century 21 the “exclusive and irrevocable” right 
to sell TES’s office suite business for a six-month period, from May 19, 2003, to November 18, 
2003.[1]  If the business sold on terms acceptable to TES during this exclusive listing period, 
TES owed Century 21 a 10-percent commission, regardless of who originated the sale. 
            Included in the agreement was an “extender” clause.  The extender clause provided that 
the same 10-percent commission “shall be due . . . (c) if within 180 calendar days of the final 
termination . . . of this Agreement, the Property is sold, conveyed, or otherwise transferred to 
anyone with whom the Broker has had negotiations or to whom the Property was shown prior to 
the final termination,” with one exception: “This section (c) shall not apply if Seller enters into a 
valid Brokerage Listing Agreement with another licensed real estate Broker after the final 
termination of this Exclusive Brokerage Listing Agreement.” 
            In late January 2004, after the exclusive listing expired but still within the 180-day 
extender-clause period, TES sold its business to a buyer to whom Century 21 had shown it 
during the exclusive listing period, Chip Lightman.  Although not a licensed broker, TES’s 
principal, Michael Vespi, had once owned a real estate agency, and he decided to handle the sale 
of TES’s business on his own, without hiring another broker.  Vespi asked Lightman if he had an 
agent or broker, and Lightman said he did not.  However, TES didn’t check with Century 21 to 
see if Lightman was someone to whom Century 21 had shown the property during the exclusive 
listing period, thus triggering a commission under the extender clause.  Mistakenly assuming the 
sale would be commission-free, TES sold its business to Lightman for a lower price than it 
would have if it had figured in a commission. 
            The following facts were found by the district court to be undisputed: (1) Century 21 
showed the TES business to Lightman during the exclusive listing period; and (2) TES sold its 
business to Lightman in January 2004, during the extender-clause period.  The brokerage 
agreement as written seems to require payment of a commission in these circumstances.  
However, the district judge held the opposite based on its additional finding that TES “did not 
knowingly ‘breach’ the Brokerage Listing Agreement by selling the property to [Lightman] at 
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the end of January 2004 when [TES] did not know Mr. Lightman was previously shown the 
property by [Century 21] during the exclusive listing period.” 
            The agent at Century 21 who handled the TES listing was appellant Keith Easton.  In 
December 2003, after the listing expired but still during the extender-clause period, Easton 
obtained his own broker’s license and left Century 21 to open Easton Business Opportunities, 
Inc.  Easton testified he bought out his listings and expirations from Century 21 when he left.  No 
formal written assignment was produced, but in a May 2006 affidavit, Century 21 broker 
Michael Brelsford, on behalf of himself and Century 21, confirmed that Easton “purchased the 
rights to all his listings in December 2003” and that the TES listing was “[a]mong the listings 
that [Century 21] transferred” to Easton.  TES knew Easton had left Century 21 and how to 
contact him: TES’s principal, Vespi, leased Easton the office space he moved into when he left 
Century 21, and Vespi hired Easton as broker on another property of his. 
            Some time later, Lightman decided to resell the TES office suite business and asked 
Easton to act as listing agent and broker on the resale.  Thus having learned about TES’s 
business being sold to a buyer he’d developed while with Century 21, Easton asked TES for the 
commission Easton believed was due.  TES refused.  By then, TES had allegedly transferred 
most of its assets, including the office suite sale proceeds, to either Vespi or its affiliate, Town 
Consulting LLC. 
            Appellants Keith Easton and Easton Business Opportunities, Inc. (collectively, Easton) 
sued for the commission, naming respondents TES, Vespi, and Town Consulting (collectively, 
TES) as defendants on breach of contract, alter ego, unjust enrichment, and fraudulent 
conveyance claims.  After a one-day bench trial, the district court entered judgment against 
Easton on all claims and, thereafter, awarded respondents their attorney fees and costs.  Easton 
appeals. 
            The district court denied Easton’s claims on three grounds relevant to this appeal.[2]  
First, it held that Century 21’s assignment of its commission rights to Easton was invalid and 
came too late in any event for Easton to qualify as the real party in interest under NRCP 17(a), as 
construed in Thelin v. Intermountain Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc., 80 Nev. 285, 392 P.2d 
626 (1964).  Second, it held that no commission was due, because neither Century 21 nor Easton 
reminded TES about the extender clause or gave TES a list of prospective buyers who were off-
limits during the extender-clause period.  Third, treating Easton’s fraudulent conveyance claims 
as targeting TES’s sale of its business, rather than its transfer of the sale proceeds to its affiliates, 
it denied Easton’s fraudulent conveyance claims as statutorily insufficient.  Finding error in each 
of these determinations, we reverse. 
II. 
            The first question to be addressed is assignability.  Based on the agreement as written and 
the facts the district court found to be undisputed, we conclude that the commission was 
assignable and that Century 21 validly assigned it to Easton.  From this it follows that, as 
Century 21’s assignee, Easton has real party in interest status under NRCP 17(a). 
A. 
            Under ordinary rules of contract law, a contractual right is assignable unless assignment 
materially changes the terms of the contract or the contract expressly precludes assignment.  
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 317(2)(a)-(c) (1981).  Because the law looks with “favor on 
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the free assignability of rights and frowns on restrictions that would limit or preclude 
assignability, . . . [a]nti-assignment clauses [are] narrowly construed.”  9 John E. Murray, Jr., 
Corbin on Contracts § 49.9, at 214 (rev. ed. 2007).  “To be effective, [an] antiassignment clause 
should contain a specific prohibition on the power to make an assignment and specifically state 
that any attempted assignments will be void or invalid.”  29 Richard A. Lord, Williston on 
Contracts § 74:22 (4th ed. 2003); see Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 322 (1981). 
            Century 21’s assignment of commission rights to Easton did not materially change the 
terms of the brokerage agreement as to TES.  The assignment occurred, at the earliest, when 
Easton left Century 21 in December 2003, after the exclusive listing terminated.  By then, 
Century 21 had provided the exclusive listing services for which TES owed its return 
performance—payment of a commission should the business be sold during the extender-clause 
period to a buyer Century 21 had shown the property to while listing it.  “When the obligor’s 
duty is to pay money, a change in the person to whom the payment is to be made is not ordinarily 
material,” Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 317 cmt. d (1981), and there is nothing 
extraordinary about the assignment of commission rights here.[3] 
            Neither does the brokerage agreement contain a valid anti-assignment clause.  The 
district court held otherwise, calling on the clause in the agreement prohibiting oral 
modifications to do double duty as an anti-assignment clause.  But the clause on which the 
district court relied says only that “[t]he terms of this Agreement may not be amended, modified 
or altered except through a written agreement signed by all of the parties.” This standard no-oral-
modification clause does not mention assignment, much less specifically prohibit it.  It lacks the 
specific language prohibiting assignment that the law requires of a valid anti-assignment clause. 
            Forbidding oral modification and prohibiting assignment are two different things.  As 
Citibank, N.A. v. Tele/Resources, Inc., 724 F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1983), holds, a standard no-oral-
modification clause cannot be pressed into service as an anti-assignment clause because, without 
more, “[a]n assignment does not modify the terms of the underlying contract.  It is a separate 
agreement between the assignor and assignee which merely transfers the assignor’s contract 
rights, leaving them in full force and effect as to the party charged.”  Id. at 269. 
            For these reasons we disagree with the district court’s reading of the brokerage agreement 
as a matter of law and conclude that, as written, the brokerage agreement permitted Century 21 
to assign its commission rights to Easton. 
B. 
            The district court alternatively held that, even if the agreement permitted assignment, 
Easton still could not prevail because the assignment didn’t occur until May 2006, when 
Brelsford’s affidavit confirming Century 21’s transfer of commission rights to Easton was filed.  
Citing Thelin v. Intermountain Lumber & Builders Supply, Inc., 80 Nev. 285, 392 P.2d 626 
(1964), the district court concluded that post-suit “[a]ssignments do not ‘relate back’ to the date 
[a] Complaint was filed,” requiring dismissal under NRCP 17(a).  This was error, for two 
reasons. 
            First, Thelin was decided in 1964, before the 1971 amendments to the real party in 
interest provisions in NRCP 17(a).  The 1971 amendments conformed NRCP 17(a) to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 17(a), as the latter had been amended in 1966, adding the following final sentence to Rule 
17(a): 
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No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of 
the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection 
for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, 
the real party in interest; and such ratification, joinder or substitution shall have 
the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party 
in interest. 
The purpose of these amendments was to make unmistakably clear that “the modern function of 
the [real party in interest] rule in its negative aspect is simply to protect the defendant against a 
subsequent action by the party actually entitled to recover, and to insure generally that the 
judgment will have its proper effect as res judicata.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) advisory committee’s 
note (1966). 
            Even before these amendments, Thelin’s rigid holding—that a post-suit assignment 
cannot cure an initial real party in interest deficiency—was questionable.  See Kilbourn v. 
Western Surety Co., 187 F.2d 567, 571-72 (10th Cir. 1951) (deeming a post-suit assignment 
sufficient to establish the assignee-plaintiff as the real party in interest under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
17(a), given the overriding purpose of the modern Rules of Civil Procedure “to unshackle the 
practice of law in the courts from the straight jacket of technical rules of pleading and 
procedure”), noted in 6A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 
2d § 1545, at 351 n.11 (1990).  After Rule 17(a)’s amendment, it is today taken as settled law 
that “[t]here is no general requirement as to when an assignment must be made and . . .  even 
when the claim is not assigned until after the action has been instituted, the assignee is the real 
party in interest and can maintain the action.”  6A Wright & Miller, supra, at 350-51.  See 
Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Hurdman, 655 F. Supp. 259, 267 (E.D. Cal. 1987) (noting that if 
the assignor provides post-suit confirmation of the assignment, the objecting defendant is 
protected from inconsistent claims; whether treated as an assignment or a ratification, this is 
enough to establish a plaintiff’s real party in interest status under Rule 17(a) (quoting Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 17(a) advisory committee’s note (1966); 6C Wright & Miller, supra, § 1545, at 654 
(1971)). 
            The affidavit that Century 21/Brelsford filed in this case confirmed that Easton had the 
sole right to sue for the commission, and it evidenced both Century 21’s assignment of rights to 
Easton and its ratification of Easton’s right to sue.  This amply protected TES from inconsistent 
claims or judgments; Rule 17(a) didn’t require more.  To the extent Thelin suggests that a 
plaintiff cannot establish real party in interest status and avoid dismissal by post-suit ratification 
or assignment of rights, it conflicts with the prevailing interpretation of the post-amendment 
version of NRCP 17(a) and no longer represents good law. 
            There is a second, equally basic reason to reject Thelin’s application to this case: The 
finding that the assignment didn’t occur until May 2006, the date of the Century 21/Brelsford 
affidavit, is in error.  The error is either one of law, in presupposing, as TES contends, that a 
valid assignment requires a signed writing or notice to the obligor; or an error of fact, in 
transposing the date of the Century 21/Brelsford affidavit (May 2006) with the date of the 
assignment itself (December 2003, per both Brelsford’s affidavit and Easton’s testimony).  Either 
way the result is the same: The district court’s alternative finding that there was a valid 
assignment is correct, but the assignment occurred in December 2003 and not May 2006. 
9 
 
            “[I]n the absence of statute or a contract provision to the contrary, there are no prescribed 
formalities that must be observed to make an effective assignment.” 9 Corbin on Contracts, 
supra, § 47.7, at 147.  The assignor must manifest a present intention to transfer its contract right 
to the assignee.  Stuhmer v. Centaur Sculpture Galleries, 110 Nev. 270, 275, 871 P.2d 327, 331 
(1994).  Absent some additional contract- or statute-based requirement, no particular formality in 
expressing that intention needs to be followed: 
It is essential to an assignment of a right that the obligee manifest an intention to 
transfer the right to another person without further action or manifestation of 
intention by the obligee.  The manifestation may be made to the other or to a third 
person on his behalf and, except as provided by statute or by contract, may be 
made either orally or by a writing. 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 324 (1981); see id. cmt. a.  Applying section 324 here, the 
manifestation of intent to transfer a contract right was by Century 21, as “obligee,” to Easton, as 
“the other.”  The assignment was complete as of December 8, 2003, the date both Brelsford and 
Easton say Century 21 accepted payment from Easton in exchange for certain listings and 
expiration rights, including TES’s. 
            Century 21 did not confirm the transfer of rights in writing until it supplied the Brelsford 
affidavit in May 2006.  However, nothing required a signed writing for the assignment of 
commission rights to be effective.  As discussed above, the brokerage agreement is silent on 
assignment; it neither precludes nor specifies a particular form for a valid assignment.  Nor have 
the parties identified any statute that prescribes special formalities for assignment of commission 
rights.[4] 
            TES finally complains that neither Century 21 nor Easton gave notice of the assignment 
until Easton demanded the commission but this argument is a nonstarter.  While failure to give 
notice of an assignment may affect the rights of the assignee in the event the obligor delivers 
performance to the obligee/assignor before being notified of the assignment, see 29 Williston on 
Contracts, supra, § 74:15, it normally does not invalidate an otherwise valid assignment.  6A 
C.J.S. Assignments § 10 (2004).  See also Wood v. Chicago Title Agency, 109 Nev. 70, 847 P.2d 
738 (1993); Washoe Co. Bank v. Campbell, 41 Nev. 153, 167 P. 643 (1917). 
            For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s alternative finding that Century 21 validly 
assigned its commission rights to Easton but reject as clearly erroneous and contrary to law the 
finding that the assignment occurred in May 2006 as opposed to December 2003. 
III. 
            The second question to be addressed is the proper construction of the exclusive right-to-
sell brokerage agreement.  The district court imposed a duty on the broker to notify its seller of 
potential buyers whose history with the broker carries commission exposure on a sale during the 
extender-clause period.  Since notice wasn’t given and the seller didn’t know its buyer would 
trigger liability for a commission, the district court denied recovery.  This was error, as it 
reallocated the responsibility and risk laid out in the brokerage agreement without adequate legal 
or contractual basis for doing so. 
A. 
            Easton’s commission claim is based on the exclusive right-to-sell brokerage agreement.  
“[W]here the action is based on a listing agreement[, t]he right of the [broker] to compensation 
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must be governed by that agreement.”  Nollner v. Thomas, 91 Nev. 203, 207, 533 P.2d 478, 480-
81 (1975) (footnote omitted); accord Caldwell v. Consolidated Realty, 99 Nev. 635, 638, 668 
P.2d 284, 286 (1983) (“Where a broker’s action to recover a commission . . . is based on a listing 
agreement, the terms of the agreement govern the broker’s right to compensation.”). 
            The brokerage agreement gave Century 21 the exclusive right to sell the business for a 6-
month period and added to that a 180-day extension period.  If TES sold during the extension 
period to a buyer with whom Century 21 had negotiations or to whom it showed the property 
during the exclusive listing period, TES owed Century 21 a commission (with one exception that 
does not apply here).  The brokerage agreement did not condition the seller’s liability for the 
commission on the seller being notified of potential buyers who carried commission risk or 
knowingly selling out from under the broker.  It placed liability on the seller for the commission 
if the seller sold during the extension period to a buyer to whom the broker had shown the 
property or negotiated with—in other words, it allocated the risk of being wrong about the buyer 
being commission-free to the seller.  The district court found that, without checking with the 
broker, TES sold to a buyer Century 21 had developed.  Absent breach of some other duty by 
Century 21, a commission was owed under the agreement as written.  Indeed, when asked at trial 
if the agreement didn’t support liability for a commission on TES’s sale to Lightman, even 
TES’s principal, Vespi, agreed: “That’s what the listing agreement says.  Yes, sir.” 
            Despite this concession, TES cites King v. Dean, 249 N.E.2d 45 (Ohio 1969), and Mayo 
v. Century 21 Action Realtors, 823 S.W.2d 466 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992), and urges that the agency 
relationship between a broker and its seller requires imposing on the broker the duty to advise the 
seller of the names of potential buyers who carry commission exposure, even where, as here, the 
agreement does not state this duty.  These cases represent the minority rule on an issue that has 
divided courts nationally.  T.C. Williams, Annotation, Real-Estate Broker’s Right to 
Commissions as Affected by Owner’s Ignorance of Fact That Purchaser Had Been Contacted by 
Broker, 142 A.L.R. 275 (1943 & Supp. 2010) (collecting cases). 
            The majority view holds that, “[h]aving promised the broker a commission, the principal 
ordinarily should know that the appearance of a customer may have been caused by the broker, 
and to avoid liability for payment he should make inquiries of the broker.”  Restatement 
(Second) of Agency § 448 cmt. f (1958).  The Restatement illustrates its comment with the 
following: 
P promises A a commission if he will secure a purchaser for Blackacre.  A 
advertises, and T, seeing it, goes to A.  T feigns indifference but soon afterward 
applies to P.  P asks T if he comes as a result of any action on the part of A.  T 
falsely says that he has not seen A’s advertisement.  Without speaking to A, and 
because he believes T’s statement, P sells to him at a price lower than the asking 
price.  A is entitled to his commission. 
Id. illus. 9.  These are analogous to the facts presented here, and represent the better-reasoned 
view.  Monadnock Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Manning, 374 A.2d 961, 510 (N.H. 1977); see also 
Shands v. Wm R. Winton, Ltd., 91 P.3d 416, 419 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004). 
            At least one state, Minnesota, has imposed the duty for which TES contends by statute.  
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 82.21(1)(b)(5) (West 2009), discussed in Barlow Burke, Jr., Law of Real 
Estate Brokers § 4.03, at 4-42 (2009) (noting that the Minnesota statute requires that a broker 
who uses an extender clause—there called an override clause—“must supply the vendors with a 
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‘protective list’ of prospects with whom the broker has dealt during the listing period”).  And, of 
course, parties are free to negotiate and include a clause requiring the broker to give the seller 
notice of those buyers to whom a sale during the extension period will trigger a commission—
such clauses, if included, are upheld.  Burke, supra, at 4-32; 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 253 (2009) 
(noting that parties can contractually require notice of prospective buyers who carry commission 
risk and that, absent contractual provision or other special circumstance, the seller’s ignorance of 
the broker’s involvement does not normally defeat liability for a commission).  But absent 
contract provision or statutory requirement, we are loath to impose such an obligation as a matter 
of common law and, in so doing, rewrite the agreement according to our views of public policy 
pertaining to the best form of contract to govern a broker’s relationship with its seller.  5 
Williston on Contracts, supra, § 12:3 (“public policy . . . requires that parties of full age and 
competent understanding must have the greatest freedom of contracting, and contracts, when 
entered into freely and voluntarily, must be upheld and enforced by the courts”). 
B. 
            As a fallback, TES argues that the agreement, which was on a form supplied by the 
broker, should be construed against Easton, as Century 21’s assignee.  However, TES fails to 
identify any textual ambiguity in the agreement or other legal basis for importing this policy-
based duty into the written agreement both parties signed.  The commission could have been 
avoided or passed on to the buyer if the seller had checked with the broker and either declined 
the deal or increased its price.  This practical consideration didn’t introduce an ambiguity into the 
agreement or confront the district court with conflicting legal duties.  It had significance only as 
a commonsense solution to the problem the seller said required the court to read new terms into 
the agreement. 
            When asked for an interpretation of the extender clause that did not require payment of a 
commission in this case, TES’s principal, Vespi, had no answer, except to say that he didn’t read 
the agreement or have it in mind when he sold to Lightman.  But see Holzman v. Blum, 726 
A.2d 818, 831 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999) (“The Agreement clearly addressed the terms and 
conditions under which [the sellers] would owe the Broker a fee and [the Broker] had no legal 
duty to remind [sellers] of the terms of the Agreement that [they] had signed.”).  To imply a duty 
into an integrated agreement requiring the broker to notify the seller of the prospects it 
developed—or to remind the seller of its obligations under an extender clause—would impinge 
on the parties’ freedom of contract with regard to the compensation to be paid the agent, as to 
which the parties, here both equally sophisticated, dealt with each other at arm’s length, and is 
inappropriate.  Id. at 831-32.[5] 
            Nollner v. Thomas, 91 Nev. 203, 533 P.2d 478 (1975), is analogous.  Nollner involved an 
open listing agreement.  “To avoid disputes the parties fixed the conditions upon which a 
commission would be payable and agreed upon the provision for payment if a sale was made in 
accordance with the contract terms.”  Id. at 207, 533 P.2d at 481.  The sale didn’t qualify for a 
commission under the agreement as written, but the district court implied terms into the 
agreement to allow recovery by the broker.  Id.  This court reversed, holding that it was error to 
“read into [the agreement] a clause or condition which does not exist.”  Id.  Although the 
outcomes are opposite in terms of who wins, this case and Nollner invoke under the same legal 
principle: A court has the obligation to enforce an unambiguous agreement as written, absent 
conflict with statute, offense to public policy, ambiguity, fraud, unconscionability, or other 
recognized basis for avoidance. 
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C. 
            The parties mention “procuring cause” in their briefs but do not identify any legitimate 
role for the doctrine in this case.  Where, as here, the “parties negotiated specific terms for 
payment of [a] commission, [the] ‘procuring cause’ doctrine [is] not a part of [the] listing 
agreement so as to modify those terms,” Carrigan v. Ryan, 109 Nev. 797, 799, 858 P.2d 29, 31 
(1993) (citing Nollner, 91 Nev. at 207, 533 P.2d at 481), especially in the context of a 
commission claim based exclusively on an exclusive right-to-sell agreement, see Atwell v. 
Southwest Securities, 107 Nev. 820, 825, 820 P.2d 766, 769-70 (1991).  In the exclusive right-to-
sell context, “[t]he duty to pay the commission is not viewed as a remedial penalty for breach of 
an executory contract but as a debt owed for a fully performed contract [and] it is unnecessary 
for the broker to prove that he . . . was the procuring cause of the sale” if any of the eventualities 
stated in the agreement as giving rise to liability for the commission occur.  10 Patrick Rohan, 
Bernard Goldstein & Charles Bobis, Real Estate Brokerage Law and Practice § 4.06[5][a] 
(2009).  Here, the district court found that Century 21 showed the property to Lightman during 
the exclusive listing period and that TES sold the property to him during the extender-clause 
period.  Liability for the commission was thus established as a matter of law on these facts under 
the agreement as written. 
IV. 
            The final issue concerns Easton’s fraudulent conveyance claim.  From the record, it 
appears that Easton asserted this claim under NRS Chapter 112.  The fraudulent conveyance 
claim did not concern TES’s sale of its business to Lightman (the buyer of the business) but 
TES’s transfer of the proceeds of that sale and other assets to its affiliates, Vespi and/or Town 
Consulting.  Because the district court did not make the findings required to adjudicate the 
fraudulent conveyance claim under Herup v. First Boston Financial, 123 Nev. 228, 162 P.3d 870 
(2007), and Sportsco Enterprises v. Morris, 112 Nev. 625, 917 P.2d 934 (1996), we reverse and 
remand for further proceedings on the fraudulent conveyance claim.  This disposition also leads 
us to vacate the award of attorney fees, which was premised on the judgment against Easton on 
the commission claim. 
            REVERSED and REMANDED. 
  
PARRAGUIRRE, C.J., and DOUGLAS, J., concur. 
  
**********FOOTNOTES********** 
[1]        TES held a master lease on the office suite business.  Although the district court’s 
findings refer to TES being sold, it appears from the record that this was an asset sale of TES’s 
rights in the master lease, personal property, and goodwill, not a sale of ownership rights in TES. 
[2]        Easton does not challenge the district court’s rejection of alter ego liability or the partial 
summary judgment order declaring that Vespi signed the agreement as manager for TES, not 
individually. 
[3]        Since Century 21 had already performed its listing services, no question arises as to it 
having remaining obligations to TES “so ‘personal’ or involv[ing] such unique skills that [they] 
may not be delegated.”  9 Corbin on Contracts, supra, § 49.4, at 199.  Assigning its commission 
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rights wouldn’t have discharged any remaining duties of Century 21’s in any event, absent a 
novation, which isn’t asserted.  See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 318 cmt. d (1981) (“An 
obligor is discharged by the substitution of a new obligor only if the contract so provides or if the 
obligee makes a binding manifestation of assent, forming a novation.  Otherwise, the obligee 
retains his original right against the obligor.”) (citations omitted). 
[4]        The parties make no argument that NRS 645.320(1), as a type of statute of frauds, 
required Century 21’s assignment of commission rights to Easton to be in writing.  Given the 
general law that, while statute of frauds provisions may “prevent enforcement against an assignor 
unless there is a memorandum in writing or some substitute formality, . . . they cannot ordinarily 
be asserted by third persons, including the obligor of an assigned right,” Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 324 cmt. b (1981), we decline to find a writing requirement based on NRS 
645.320(1) sua sponte.  See also In re Circle K Corp., 127 F.3d 904, 908 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(rejecting the argument that the obligor could assert a valid statute of frauds objection to his 
obligee’s undocumented transfer of its interest to its assignee; “[t]he parties to the assignments 
do not challenge their validity; it would be for them, not [the obligor], to raise the statute of 
frauds as a defense to enforcement of the assignments if they so chose”) (citing Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts § 144 (1982)). 
[5]        The fact that the agreement was on a standard realtor’s Multiple Listing Service form 
does not defeat its enforcement, as TES suggests.  The rule that contracts should be construed 
against the drafter—contra proferentem—applies only “as a rule of last resort when the contract 
is ambiguous or unconscionable.”  Thompson v. Amoco Oil Co., 903 F.2d 1118, 1121 n.3 (7th 
Cir. 1990).  Ambiguity is not established and unconscionability is not asserted. 
 
 
